Konferensartikel

Contribution of Resilience to the Analysis of Flight Crew Decision-Making

D. Delaitre
BEA – Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la såcuritå de l’aviation civile, Statistics and Safety Analysis Division, Le Bourget, France

D. Nouvel
BEA – Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la såcuritå de l’aviation civile, Statistics and Safety Analysis Division, Le Bourget, France

Y. Pouliquen
BEA – Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la såcuritå de l’aviation civile, Statistics and Safety Analysis Division, Le Bourget, France

S. Travadel
BEA – Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la såcuritå de l’aviation civile, Statistics and Safety Analysis Division, Le Bourget, France

Ladda ner artikelhttp://www.ep.liu.se/ecp_article/index.en.aspx?issue=023;article=003

Ingår i: Proceedings of the Resilience Engineering Workshop; 25-27 June; 2007; Vadstena; Sweden

Linköping Electronic Conference Proceedings 23:3, s. 13-21

Visa mer +

Publicerad: 2007-07-28

ISBN:

ISSN: 1650-3686 (tryckt), 1650-3740 (online)

Abstract

It is noticeable that in some incidents crews deviate from standard procedures and continue the flight in deteriorating conditions until a triggering factor makes them return towards normal flight conditions. To be more precise; the procedures that frame the conduct of a flight refer to standards and are within a safety envelope that calls on training and reduced capacity for adaptation. The course of the flight and the reality of operational constraints may lead the flight crew to fly at the limits of the envelope. The situation can then deteriorate in a more or less prolonged or serious manner. When the crew reacts; if they do; their capacity for adaptation will either allow them to return to a normal situation or not. An investigation often makes it possible to explore the reasons for deviations from standards; though it is more difficult to explore the crew’s determination to continue the flight in deteriorated conditions: the factors that lead a pilot to perceive danger and to decide to take corrective action remain little known; as do the resilient processes that are mobilized. Based on an example of a near-CFIT; we will demonstrate the need to better characterize the evolution over time of a crew’s capacity to react when faced with a dangerous situation in order to limit the consequences.

Nyckelord

Inga nyckelord är tillgängliga

Referenser

Inga referenser tillgängliga

Citeringar i Crossref